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In vijf duidelijke lessen wordt aangegeven welke de meest gemaakte fouten 
zijn in de beslissingspraktijk van het mededingingsbeleid. De valkuilen zijn 
nochtans welbekend bij de economen die zich specialiseren in de analyse van 
de mededinging en sijpelen steeds verder door in brede kring. Het is derhalve 
makkelijk  onkunde  of  onwil  (het  dienen  van  andere  belangen)  bij 
mededingingsautoriteiten te ontmaskeren, niet enkel voor de experten maar 
ook voor een groot publiek. Het artikel legt uit welke fouten zeker vermeden 
dienen te worden, en waarom. 
 
* * * 
 
Five lessons on avoiding common mistakes in antitrust decision making are 
the subject of this contribution. Although many of the usual mistakes are well-
known by specialists in industrial organisation, practioners keep falling in the 
same trap time after time. But the  mistakes become  well-known also to a 
broader audience and hence it is easy to expose the incompetence or captivity 
of certain decision makers. The article stresses what errors are inadmissible, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Whereas the use of industrial organisation (IO) in antitrust decision making in 
the  U.S.  has  a  long  tradition,  this  activity  is  fairly  novel  in  the  European 
Union. Industrial organisation has been and is a well developed discipline in a 
variety of European Countries, but the application of academic insights to 
specific cases or even generic design of policy is largely limited to the last 
decade.
1  And still, academic economists have a hard time to get their ideas 
across.  The  main  obstacle  is  not  an  aversion  of  decision  makers  against 
industrial economics as such, but rather is explained by the fact that the skills 
are very specialised and scattered around over the literature.
2 And practioners 
mostly have not been guided through the explosion of results from industrial 
economies. 
  In  some  European  countries  like  Belgium,  decision  makers  are 
mostly people with a legal training, by the fact that half of the authority is 
composed of judges operating in the legal circuit while many other members 
(experts)  often  also  have  a  legal  background.  The  implication  is  an 
understanding  of  perfect  competition  and  monopoly,  the  so  called  “pure” 
market structures as we cover them in principles courses, but no familiarity 
with all the industry models and techniques that have been recently designed 
to  solve  antitrust  problems,  such  as  merger  simulation  based  on  discrete 
choice theory or cartel impact and stability analysis using supergames. 
  The claim made in this article is not that antitrust decision makers 
should be experienced in the use of the formentioned techniques. But since 
these techniques are important to guide the process of taking a decision in the 
good direction, they at least should have some familiarity with them. Within 
the  context  of  this  contribution,  it  is  impossible  to  achieve  the  target  of 
transferring sufficient knowledge to reach a full understanding of the recent 
models and techniques that constitute the economic foundation for antitrust 
decision making. A certain degree of familiarity however is a feasible goal we 
set out for. Further material is covered in Van Cayseele (1994) and Motta 
(2004). An historical perspective is given in Van Cayseele and Van den Bergh 
(2000). 
  The organisation of this article then is centered around some lessons 
that illustrate the pitfalls that often misguide decision makers. Although these 
erroneous principles are well known among industrial organisation experts, 
they survive for some reason or another among practionisers.
3  Therefore, the 
target audience for this article precisely are judges or government officials 
involved in competition policy, as well as managers and lawyers defending 
companies in antitrust cases. Avoiding the mistakes that are documented is 
important for everyone, and not in the least for those who take decisions or 
defend their clients, since the mistakes are easily exposed to a broad audience 
and well understood by the economic profession at large, implying a serious 
loss of reputation to those involved in the mistakes. 
  The  presentation  of  this  article  falls  short  of  claiming  to  be 
exhaustive. Many more shortcomings in the practice of competition policy  
can be exposed by the discipline of industrial organisation. The field of IO 
also can be very helpful in other area’s, see De Bondt ((2000) and (2005)) for 
the impact on strategic management, and Van Cayseele ((1995), (1998) and 
(2004a)) for the contributions to banking, high tech industries, as well as other 
area’s of economics.
4  For the  moment,  we only can advise the interested 
reader  to  consult  these  references.  We  now  focus  on  five  “don’ts”  in  the 
practice of antitrust decision making. 
 
 
II. DON’T FOCUS ON THE NUMBER OF FIRMS OR CONCENTRATION 
RATIO’S AS SUCH 
 
In  the  merger  review  process,  the  purpose  is  to  assess  the  impact  of  the 
operation on the prices after the merger. The test in fact is whether the merger 
will create a Small but Significant Nontransitory Increase in Prices, or SSNIP. 
Usually, a price increase of 5 percent is considered to be the threshold not to 
pass in order to get clearance for the operation. 
  In figure 1 below, which has been coined by John Sutton (1991) the 
( ) N P  function, it is shown how different industry models yield remarkable 
different predictions regarding the post  merger price increase. The  ( ) N P  
function  traces  the  relationship  between  the  price  charged  by  the  firms  in 
industry and the number of firms that is active in the industry. Clearly, the 
( ) N P  function is not very informative as to what can be said in general 
when due to a merger the number of firms decreases from say 5 to 4. 
  Figure 1 is best read as follows: on the horizontal axis is the number 
of  firms,  the  C4  concentration  ratio  in  the  second  row  as  well  as  the 
Hirshmann-Herfindahl index in the third row. On the vertical axis is the price 
level associated with  ( ) ..... 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 = N  symmetric firms competing with 
each other in a particular way. Three different industry models are shown: 
cartel  (the  independent  firms  collude  overtly  or  tacitly  and  in  fact  do  not 
compete), Cournot (the independent firms produce outputs which are sold by 
a Wallasian auctioneer who determines a market clearing price) and Bertrand 
(the independent firms compete by quoting prices to the market). 
 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
FIGURE 1 
The P(N) function for Betrand, Cartel and Cournot model of industry 
 
 
Clearly, for two models out of three, the merger has no impact on 
prices, for regardless whether the number of competitors is two, three, four or 
more, the price charged by the firm is either equal to the monopoly price (in  
the Cartel case) or equal to marginal cost (in the Bertrand case). This implies 
that the merger readily can be cleared in both cases, although in the first case 
a “cellophane type of fallacy”
5 is made. Only in case of the Cournot model, 
the price would increase when out of five competitors two merge, notably 
with 6,66 percent.
6 
  This clearly indicates that antitrust authorities when they engage in a 
merger review process should do somewhat more than look at the number of 
firms or concentration ratio. If that is the only activity in which the authority 
is engaged in, it is redundant, for figure 1 clearly indicates that what matters is 
the shape of the  ( ) N P  function, not the number on the abcissa of the graph. 
This implies that antitrust authorities should investigate what the true model 
of  competition  in  the  industry  is,  and  calibrate  it  to  the  observed  data  on 
market  shares,  prices,  …..  Only  then  it  becomes  possible  to  simulate  the 
effects of a merger, by focussing on the so-called unilateral effects. The latter 
have a sound foundation in economic theory. They more precisely rest on the 
non-cooperative game theoretic solution concept introduced by Noble Prize in 
Economics laureate John Nash, see Werden (2005) for a description of the 
methodology of merger simulation. 
  Picking the appropriate industry model is tantamount to tracing the 
locus of the  ( ) N P  function and that is not an easy task, since many other 
models of industry than Bertrand, Cartel or Cournot exist.  For one thing, all 
of the above models assume homogeneous goods, but most industries produce 
heterogeneous  goods,  that  is  the  world  is  characterized  by  product 
differentiation. For such an environment, product differentiation models have 
been  designed  and  applied  to  various  cases,  see  Van  Bergeijk  and 
Kloosterhuis (2005) for a collection of case studies in European countries.
7 
This implies that the technicalities of the models are no longer an obstacle, 
since “canned” solutions have been developed to be readily applicable. As 
pointed out by Werden (2005), initial results are obtained after one week of 
work, and hence the argument that at least some form of merger simulation 
cannot be done within the brief delays that antitrust authorities get to decide 
on a case is no longer valid. 
  Moreover,  these  studies  often  yield  very  powerful  insights  for 
management or political decisions. Therefore, one should expect to see more 
of them already in place before a merger case comes up, although it still tends 
to  be  the  other  way  around.  A  good  example  is  Van  Cayseele  (2005a), 
showing that the merger between Hessenatie and Noord Natie, two container 
traffic handlers situated in the port of Antwerp could be cleared, although 
both  players  together  have  substantial  market  shares.  The  reason  is  that 
container handlers in the port of Antwerp face sufficient competition from 
those  located  in  Bremen,  Hamburg,  Rotterdam  and  Le  Havre.  But 
interestingly, Antwerp due to its inland location and the lack of depth of the 
Scheld faces a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Rotterdam, or conversely 
Rotterdam has a source of market power which can be exploited. This leads to 
the amazing conclusion that deepening the Scheld and improving the access  
of  the  port  of  Antwerp,  could  benefit  the  Dutch  economy  as  well,  since 
importers  located  in  the  Netherlands  also  would  benefit  from  the  stronger 
competitive pressure that Antwerp can put on Rotterdam when it becomes 
more  accessible.  But  typically  the  Dutch  government  was  not  so  keen  on 
taking up engagements to deepen the Scheld, mainly invoking the possible 
environmental damage that could result from this process. 
  In order to conclude for the first lesson that can be learned from the 
recent European practices in competition policy, it is clear that the mere focus 
on the number of players in an industry no longer is sufficient for decision 
making. Well-elaborated alternatives exist and can readily be applied, so if an 
authority  is  spotted  that  only  looks  at  numbers  of  firms  or  concentration 
ratio’s, it should quickly be exposed as a redundant agency. This will become 
even more pronounced as industry and politics more and more use models to 
cast consumer demand for the various products and services that firms offer to 
the market, or to compute the welfare impact of government regulation. 
 
 
III. DON’T JUMP TO “MONOPOLY” CONCLUSIONS, FOR EVEN WITH 
ONE  OR  TWO  FIRMS,  IT  IS  NOT  STRAIGHTFORWARD  TO 
CONCLUDE ON PERFORMANCE 
 
As the result of many initiatives taken by the internal market directorate of the 
European  Commission,  many  players  who  were  previously  sheltered  from 
competition  now  became  exposed  to  competition  from  their  counterparts 
abroad. Electricity, telecom, stock exchanges are but a few examples where 
competition  was  organized  along  a  “vertical  silo”  model,  where  in  each 
country a monopolist would produce, distribute, retail etc. The obligation to 
provide  access  to  each  stage  has  led  to  many  complaints  regarding  unfair 
access conditions, differential treatment, a.s.o.. 
  Of course, this kind of problem had been experienced long before in 
the U.S. with the deregulation of telecom and the breaking up of the Bell 
AT&T monopoly. The contestable market model resulted, see Baumol, Panzar 
and Willig (1982). Essentially, contestable market theory argues that there is 
no reason to fear the monopoly, at least under certain conditions. One such 
condition is that there is a potential entrant to which consumers readily can 
switch if the monopoly starts exploiting its market power. We will further 
elaborate on the force of entry in the fourth lesson. 
  For  the  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  there  are  many  other 
arguments in the literature that on the one hand a single player in industry, i.e. 
a monopolist, does not need to have market power per se, while on the other 
hand  in  a  duopoly  one  can  get  monopoly  market  power  even  without  an 
explicit cartel agreement. We first explain why a single player does not need 
to have market power and next show why the converse result equally can 
hold, that is a duopoly achieves the textbook monopoly outcome. 
  One of the first to argue that many monopolies have limited market 
power  was  Noble  Prize  in  Economics  laureate  Ronald  Coase.  In  Coase  
(1972), it is argued that the lack of commitment power by a monopolist who 
sells a durable good will lead to a near perfectly competitive outcome. The 
reason is a simple one: consumers with a certain valuation of the good expect 
that  once  they  have  bought,  the  monopolist  will  lower  his  price  to  serve 
consumers with a lower valuation of the good. But if that is the case, they 
better can wait for the monopolist to lower his price. And the monopolist in 
turn can do nothing else than to lower his price, all the way to the lowest 
valuation he ever would serve, but that is precisely the competitive price. 
  Whereas many scholars have raised their scepticism vis-à-vis the so 
called  “Coase  conjecture”,  see  Fudenberg  and  Tirole  (1991)  for  a  careful 
analysis  of  the  argument,  industrial  organisation  has  incorporated  the 
argumentation to elaborate on competition that emerges  from second hand 
markets, see Bulow (1982). When a producer sells a durable good, others can 
start competing with the monopolist when consumers who no longer need the 
service of the good resell to them. This was the case in the famous Aluminium 
Company  of  America  (ALCOA)  case,  where  it  was  argued  that  a  proper 
delineation of the market should include the sales of the recycled aluminium. 
According to the judge, this wasn’t the case since ALCOA once controlled all 
the sales of primary aluminium and hence could also control the future supply 
by second-hand suppliers. 
  The real problem (to ALCOA) however is not the fact that it has to 
control  what it sells today to steer the  supply it  will compete  with in the 
future,  the  problem  is  that  ALCOA  cannot  control  its  future  supply  of 
aluminium. Therefore, buyers of aluminium know that when they re-sell later 
on, there will be more aluminium on the market, and hence the resale value 
will be less than what they would detain when ALCOA would shut down 
immediately  after  they  had  bought.  If  they  kept  the  aluminium  for  a 
considerable time and ALCOA meanwhile floods the market with aluminium, 
their resale value even would become zero. But the willingness to pay for 
aluminium today depends on both the reservation value they have for using 
the aluminium for some time, and the resale value they obtain for it when they 
don’t  use  it  anymore  and  resell.  Hence  when  ALCOA  completely  lacks 
commitment power and floods the market, buyers will not take into account 
any of the resale value of it and a much lower price will result. In fact when 
buyers  of  aluminium  expect  that  ALCOA  will  flood  the  market 
instantaneously after they have bought, they will conjecture that aluminium is 
a  ubiquity  and  they  will  hold  back  their  purchases  of  aluminium  for  they 
expect it to be free tomorrow. Again this leaves ALCOA no other choice than 
not to charge today. Or the Coase conjuncture with consumers using the good 
forever and the monopolistic seller lacking commitment power is equivalent 
to  ALCOA’s  problem  with  a  second-hand  market  for  aluminium.  In  Van 
Cayseele (1993) I show in a  more formal  way  under  what conditions this 
equivalence carries though. Therefore, the two approaches can often be used 
interchangeably, and this opens new avenues to understand markets where 
competition intrinsically is intertemporal.  
  In  reality,  many  industries  exist  for  which  there  are  players  who 
operate on the primary market and others on the secondary. The general idea 
that consumers take into account the linkages between these markets ex ante 
then often exerts sufficient discipline onto the players. More in particular, it is 
sufficient that there is strong competition in one stage, that the possibilities to 
exploit market power in other stages are limited. With markets for spare parts 
for  example,  car  manufacturers  could  easily  exploit  their  position  when  a 
component breaks down, and overcharge the unfortunate consumer who’s car 
broke  down.  The  fact  that  this  game  is  practiced  however  would  quickly 
spread among consumers who would turn to other car manufacturers in the 
primary  market.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  sole  expectation  that  a  car 
manufacturer could behave in such way when he lacks commitment, has lead 
car  manufacturers  to  commit  to  guarantees  of  all  kinds,  where  they  sell 
besides cars an insurance policy for the repair of certain parts when they break 
down  before  100.000  kilometers,  for  example.  Nonetheless,  in  Hugain  v. 
Commission, the market was defined “as the U.K. market for spare parts”. 
  When  sometimes  a  monopoly  has  no  market  power,  the  converse 
equally could be true. A duopoly (or oligopoly) then has the same power that 
can be achieved by a textbook monopoly. This will be the case for example 
even when the duopolists compete in prices, but have the possibility to buy 
each others’ output before consumers can acquire it. In Van Cayseele and 
Furth (1996), it is made clear that for the simultaneous move game where 
firms  at  the  same  point  in  time  announce  prices,  the  outcome  is  far  less 
competitive than the Bertrand outcome. In Van Cayseele and Furth (2001), it 
even becomes clear that the monopoly outcome is achieved when one firm 
leads  and  the  other  follows.  In  some  cases,  the  Stackelberg  leader  and 
follower even can be determined endogenously, and the resulting “natural” 
division  of  the  profits  provides  a  noncooperative  rationale  for  a  particular 
cartel division rule which sometimes is said to be used when cartels have 
formed. 
  While the fact that one firm buys out the output of another might 
seem odd, this practice often is observed in reality in industries like airlines, 
electricity, diamonds a.s.o.. But the research started by noticing that officials 
of the O’Neill headquarters at some point in time entered shops to buy …… 
O’Neill clothes. As such, the technique might be an effective way to establish 
resale price maintenance. Only recently, Décathlon was convicted in France 
because shopkeepers and officials from the headquarters eliminated the output 
of other shopkeepers who sold Décathlon products at a discount. 
  To conclude for the second lesson, again, the number of firms as 
such is useless as an indicator for the performance of the industry. In some 
cases, two rivals  will be able to achieve the textbook  monopoly outcome, 
while sometimes a monopolist will not do better than a firm operating under 
perfect  competition.  To  highlight  these  peculiar  findings,  industrial 
economists have published articles with provocative titles such as: “One is 
Almost Enough for Monopoly”, see Ausubel and Deneckere (1987), or “Two 
is  not  too  Many  for  Monopoly”,  see  Van  Cayseele  and  Furth  (2001).  
Industrial economics will be of a tremendous aid to decision makers in these 
industries, but the solutions here are not ready-made. Careful analysis of the 
underlying  competition  game  between  primary  producers,  secondary 




IV. DON’T FOCUS ON ONE SIDE OF THE MARKET WHEN IT IS TWO-
SIDED 
 
In the same spirit of European market integration, many other industries that 
previously  had  been  organised  at  the  national  level  caught  the  interest  of 
regulators.  Often  payment  systems,  debet  and  credit  cards,  stock  trading 
platforms,  clearing  and  settlement  organisations,  a.s.o.  had  been  set  up  as 
associations between domestic banks, brokers and traders, or a combination of 
both. Since due to pronounced network externalities, the scale economics to 
be attained by a single player are tremendous, and hence only one of the 
above mentioned organisations existed at the state level. Again, the taste of 
monopoly, here enforced by the flavour of a joint initiative by related players, 
led to scrutiny. Especially because in the present case, antitrust authorities 
received complaints from one side of the market, who was complaining it 
subsidized the other side. 
  Meanwhile,  industrial  economists  indicated  that  many  of  these 
industries are two-sided. This means that the players cater for two distinct 
groups  of  consumers,  but  more  importantly,  that  both  groups  need  to  be 
present to a sufficient extent in order for the business to start. For example, a 
consumer  will  only  get  a  credit  card  if  he  can  pay  with  it  in  a  sufficient 
number of shops. But a shopkeeper will only invest in a terminal that can 
process the card if sufficient customers are around who desire to use the card 
for paying for their purchases. 
  An economic analysis of these so-called platforms, see Rochet and 
Tirole (2003), reveals among other things that the price structure rather than 
the price level charged to one side should be looked at. Social welfare might 
dictate that one side of the market, say merchants, subsidizes the other side, 
say cardholders. Hence, complaints by merchants that they overpay might be 
true from the viewpoint of the margins that are taken on them (by renting 
cardreaders or withholding a discount from the payment), but they could be 
warranted from the viewpoint of a welfare maximizing platform that has to 
promote the use of cards with consumers. Here, the real cause of the problem 
rather seems to be government itself who provides a free instrument of pay, 
i.e.  central  bank  notes  (cash).  Or  consumers  have  a  costless  alternative  to 
cards, namely cash, although several studies indicate that cash is extremely 
costly to society. What happens is that banks absorb the cost of handling cash 
and hence are forced, together with merchants, to cross-subsidize cash. 
  Nonetheless,  antitrust  authorities  both  in  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands  have  taken  a  severe  attitude  against  card  associations  and  
payment systems. Both Banksys and Interpay were fined for surcharging, and 
in one case the decision even stated that although there are two sides to the 
market, the focus of the case was on one side were according to the decision 
the platform misbehaved.  
  Similar considerations enter the discussion when various European 
and  national  regulations,  and  antitrust  agencies  recently  discovered  the 
securities  post-trading  businesses.  This  industry  among  others  involves 
clearing and settlement, see Van Cayseele (2004b) and Van Cayseele (2005b). 
Whereas primary settlement, that is acknowledging the new net positions in 
the security after trading occurred only can be done by the Central Securities 
Depositaries, many other banks closer to the trader can settle on their own 
books.  When  a  particular  bank  has  a  substantial  market  share  in  the 
management  of  wealth,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  most  settlement  can  occur 
internally. Hence although the CSD’s manage the “global note”, i.e. the entire 
emission  of  securities  by  the  company  that  sought  external  finance,  many 
other players provide the same services of settlement, asset servicing a.s.o. 
Nonetheless,  some  antitrust  authorities  concluded  that  the  CSD’s  held  a 
monopoly position. 
  Especially the cost of settling cross border securities transactions has 
further led to the question whether or not monopoly power was exploited. One 
could of course easily point to the substantial regulatory and tax differences 
that exist, making it much costlier to clear and settle internationally. But more 
importantly, one again should keep in mind that the market is two-sided. Also 
the companies which emit securities are clients of the platforms. And hence, if 
the platform, which mostly is user owned and governed, has to charge less on 
one side, it will have to increase charges to the other side. 
  For European clearing and settlement, which has the special feature 
that complementary platforms are involved since settlement still is organised 
on a country by country basis, except for a few (I) CSD’s, I show that it is not 
unlikely that companies will face increased tariffs, see Van Cayseele (2005b). 
For the moment, this side of the market is charged very low fees, since they 
need to be convinced to choose direct finance (emission of securities) over 
indirect  (bank  loans).When  the  investor  side  however  is  charged  less,  the 
platform will in order to break even, increase the charges to the companies. 
This might lead to a reduction of direct finance, reducing the appeal of stock 
exchanges, over-the-counter emissions, a.s.o., precisely a target the European 
Commission  should  avoid,  given  the  high  rates  of  bank  finance  already 
present in the so called “continental, bank based system”, as opposed to the 
“angle-saxon, market based model”. 
  To  conclude  for  the  third  lesson,  many  markets  are  two-sided.  In 
some cases, the explosion of the academic literature has led to an overkill, and 
practioners  have  tried  to  find  platforms  in  health  care  systems,  banking 
markets,  a.s.o..  In  a  few  cases,  mostly  related  to  payment  systems  and 
settlement however, it seems that authorities mistakenly disregard the two-
sidedness of the market. 
  
 
V. DON’T RELY (TOO MUCH) ON ENTRY 
 
When  introducing  the  second  lesson,  it  was  made  clear  that  entry  was  a 
potential strong force, possibly making antitrust authorities entirely redundant. 
The  contestable  market  model  by  Baumol  et.  al.  indeed  shows  that  a 
monopoly may be forced to charge the competitive outcome as the result of 
pressure  by  potential  rivals.  In  small  open  economies,  this  argument  was 
translated into the thesis that if domestic players exerted monopoly power, 
consumers easily could start importing from abroad. 
  It is well known that contestability has its limits in general, see Brock 
(1983), Van Cayseele and Furth (1996), as well as in particular markets (like 
banking, see Van Cayseele (2004a)). The argument that entry to a serious 
extend can do the job of competition policy however cannot be dismissed a 
priori. Therefore, in Van Cayseele (2002), I investigate a theoretical model 
where I contrast the additional gain an antitrust authority can achieve over 
free entry. It turns out that some general statements can be made merely by 
looking  at  initial  concentration  and  the  degree  of  product  differentiation, 
which is promising. The reason why in the present context, results that hold 
across industries can be proven, is that one takes a comparative approach. 
Forces that determine the bad effects of a cartel will affect the force of entry 
in an exactly predictable way. Hence, in the cases that breaking up the cartel 
is worthwhile, entry might do an equally good job, or fail, depending on but a 
few  industry  characteristics.  Undoubtedly,  this  research  agenda  offers 
unexplored possibilities for deriving “priority rules” to antitrust authorities. 
But deriving the results is complicated and for specific cases at hand, it is to 
be  doubted  whether  a  conviction  or  an  acquittal  ever  will  be  reached  by 
pointing to the fact that “the industry tends to be moderately concentrated, and 
manufactures a rather homogeneous product”. 
  On the empirical front, also work has been done to trace down the 
forces that exert pressure on industry prices. These studies can be classified 
regarding  to  whether  they  directly  analyse  entry  as  in  Geroski  (1991),  or 
indirectly. Only the last avenue is explored to some extent here. In Konings, 
Van Cayseele and Warzynski ((2001); (2005)), the force of entry is captured 
indirectly  by  focussing  on  import  competition,  and  controlling  for  other 
factors that exert pressure on price-cost margins. Efforts are undertaken to 
methodologically improve on the ways to estimate price-cost margins. It turns 
out that the force of entry has an impact that differs from country to country. 
In  direct  competition  with  a  dummy  that  captures  the  existence  of  a 
competition  authority,  it  shows  how  for  some  countries,  such  as  the 
Netherlands, competition policy accounts for the pressure on margins, and 
that few results if any have to be expected from imports. This contrasts to 
Belgium where the antitrust authority hardly has had any effect. 
  To conclude for the fourth lesson, it seems that if serious doubt exist 
in a particular case, and decision makers have to put their faith in the force of 
entry to correct for possible misbehaviour that could result from mergers, they  
better  take  their  responsibility  immediately.  Both  from  direct  and  indirect 
studies, it shows that entry is slow and weak. Often many regulations exist so 
as to make sure entry cannot exert much pressure. Lobbying activities try to 
preserve these barriers, while firms can erect others in the market. As once 
witnessed in the case of a concentrated market with a dominant player, the 
potential entrant from abroad was acquired by the dominant firm before it had 
the chance to enter the domestic market. 
 
 
VI. DON’T RELY ON WHAT RIVALS SAY 
 
For  the  last  lesson,  we  combine  insights  from  the  field  of  industrial 
organisation  with  the discipline of  information economies as pioneered by 
Baron and Myerson (1982), Milgrom (1981) and others. Already since Stigler, 
it is known that mergers and cartels not only affect insiders but also outsiders. 
In  many  cases,  an  outsider  even  will  be  better  off  than  an  insider.  To 
understand why this is the case, consider a cartel where the members agree to 
restrict the output in order to raise industry prices. All cartel members benefit 
from the increased industry price, but at the cost of limiting what they sell. 
Next consider an outsider. He also benefits from the increased industry price 
but does not need to restrict his output. Hence he wins in both directions: he 
can sell what he was used to or even more, at an increased price. It can be 
shown that for a variety of oligopoly games, it holds true that outsiders benefit 
more than insiders from a cartel or a merger. But then outsiders, for example 
to a merger, are likely to testify that the merger will not have any detrimental 
effect. The reason simply is that they should not object against it as it is going 
to benefit them. 
  When a merger is likely to yield serious cost savings, the merging 
parties can decrease their price and expand their market share, in a profitable 
way. This in turn could lead to scale economies being realized, leading to 
further cost savings, price decreases and increased market shares. The parties 
remaining outside the merger cannot realize the same cost advantages, and 
will need to keep their price at the same level. With reduced sales volumes, 
this is likely to decrease profits. But the cost savings realized by the merging 
parties are passed on to the consumers, which is beneficial to society as a 
whole. Hence the merger should be approved, but outsiders will try to block 
it, for example by stating in hearings that it increases market power. 
  Hence, when the antitrust decision maker relies on the information of 
interested  parties,  and  these  parties  have  an  interest  in  the  merger  getting 
blocked when it is bad to them but beneficial to society, they will lie in the 
hearings and try to show an increase in market power. When on the other 
hand the merging parties lie and indicate potential cost savings for the merger 
when in fact it targets increased market power, the rivals will corroborate the 
statements made by the merging parties, although untrue. Since if the merger 
goes through, the outsiders will benefit as much or more than the merging 
parties, but society will lose.  
  The fact that the incentives to rely on information of third parties 
(outsiders)  to  a  merger  are  wrongly  structured  is  confirmed  by  empirical 
evidence. Eckbo (1983) shows that the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks 
of companies not involved in a merger, but operating in an industry where the 
U.S.  authorities  investigate  a  merger,  increase.  That  is  the  stock  prices  of 
rivals  of  the  companies  that  merge,  but  where  the  U.S.  authorities  have 
serious doubts and start an investigation, have increased more than normally. 
One however has to be careful in concluding from this that the authorities 
pick the appropriate cases to investigate, since many other explanations may 
exist,  while  these  so  called  “event  studies”  are  not  without  criticism. 
Nonetheless, the method has some appeal. Recently, Duso, Neven and Röller 
(2003)  came  with  evidence  on  the  mistakes  made  by  the  European 
Commission. They show that cases which normally had to pass the merger 
review process where unjustifiably blocked. From the 4 cases, the European 
Court of Justice send back 2 cases after appeal, pointing to the lack of a sound 
economic  analysis  of  the  case.  It  is  impossible  to  know  what  precise 
arguments where used to block these cases, but if in the realm of politics and 
lobbying the European Commission has spend more time in listening to rivals 
as opposed to doing its homework, then it is not unlikely that the evidence 
obtained was not in line with the economic foundations of competition out 
there, as noted by the Court. 
  To conclude for the fifth and last lesson, it is a pity that decision 
makers tend to follow the easy way of collecting information from rivals and 
to listen to their stories rather than to spend some time in investigating the 
case at hand along the lines of an economic model. If, systematic evidence of 
wrong decisions comes up, it will be not for long until the antitrust authority 






After  having  been  exposed  to  these  five  lessons,  the  reader  might  have 
become very sceptical to the practice of antitrust decision making. There is no 
reason to. After having served for two consecutive periods of 6 years in the 
Belgian  antitrust  authority,  the  author  can  testify  that  there  are  literally 
hundreds of excellent decisions that have been taken too. And the same can be 
said for the decisions taken in other countries. Hence the lessons only are 
intended to improve upon the track record of the authorities, by avoiding that 
the few painful mistakes of the past are repeated. 
  If  there  is  one  severe  blame,  it  rests  on  the  shoulders  of  policy 
makers,  at  least  in  Belgium.  Since  I  have  documented  their  defaults 
elsewhere, at the occasion of a colloquium evaluating ten years of competition 
policy in Belgium, see Van Cayseele (2003a), I will not elaborate on this any 
further here (see also Maks and Hupkes (2005)). Should the reader however 
want to find out what determines the level of the thresholds for which merger  
review becomes mandatory, he should not be bothered with the potential costs 
of the review process to enterprise 
9. Or with considerations regarding the size 
distribution of firms in a particular industry. Rather he should know these 
thresholds are a function of the number of cases the antitrust authority has to 





1.  The European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, E.A.R.I.E., was made an 
official  organisation  at  the  event  of  the  1982  Congress  in  Leuven.  Meanwhile  the 
Katholieke  Universiteit  Leuven  hosted  the  E.A.R.I.E.  Congress  also  in  1999.  The  next 
edition will take place in Porto in the fall of this year. Among the Editors in Chief of 
Tijdschrift voor Economie and Management figures a former president of E.A.R.I.E. (R. De 
Bondt) and a member of the Executive Committee (this author). The Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven counts among its academic staff many more executive members of E.A.R.I.E. and 
editors  of  the  International  Journal  of  Industrial  Organisation,  Journal  of  Industrial 
Economics or CEPR program coordinates, more precisely L. Sleuwaegen, R. Veugelers and 
F. Verboven, to name only a few. Recently, another initiative has been taken in the form of 
the  Association  of  Competition  Economics  (A.C.E.).  This  organisation  is  even  more 
focussed on the use of industrial and micro economics and econometrics in antitrust issues 
and will hold its third conference in Copenhagen. 
2.  Some countries like Belgium had previously an elaborate system of price controls in place. 
As  in  many  area’s  of  economic  policy,  the  scene  was  organised  around  trade 
representatives, labour unions, politics a.s.o.. The installation of a “specialised court” came 
to many as a shock, and the usefulness of competition policy in a small open economy was 
questioned  by  some,  see  Sleuwaegen  and  Van  Cayseele  (1998)  for  an  analysis  of  the 
arguments. 
3.  Special interest of course could benefit from there mistakes, and hence they would do all to 
keep  the  misunderstanding  in  place.  Recently,  the  political  economy  of  antitrust  has 
focussed on the wealth transfers following from an active antitrust policy, see Rowley and 
Rathborne (2004). 
4.  Especially  high  tech  industries  merit  further  elaboration.  A  subfield  of  industrial 
organisation called “The Economics of Technological  Innovation” early on showed that 
difficult trade-offs exist between static and dynamic efficiency, see Kamien and Schwarz 
(1976). Even in terms of remedies, it is not clear what the appropriate policy measures are 
since  some  of  them  can be  abused by  dominant players  in the  market.  Kamien  (2005) 
provides an intricate analysis of there practices. A related issue is whether R&D cooperation 
should perhaps be stimulated explicitly by  government, see Hinlooper (2003) or Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2002) on this issue. 
5.  The “cellophane fallacy” was documented in the well-known Du Pont case where the U.S. 
Supreme Court defined the market in a very wide way. This means that competitors are 
identified which by no means exert a truly disciplinarily force on the pricing behaviour of a 
dominant firm. Hence should they merge with the dominant firm, this hardly will lead to a 
price increase, since the dominant firm already could price in an independent way before the 
merger. 
6.  When N Cournot competitors face a linear market demand function that links the Walrasian 







 in the following way:  Q P - =1 , it 








1 * . 
Hence, when c = .25 and N = 5, the pre-merger price equals .375. When two firms merge,  
one obtains .40, or a price increase of .025. Percentagewise, this boils down to a price 
increase by 6,66%, which would violate SSNIP5. 
7.  Industries for which well developed specifications of the demand in the presence of product 
differentiation exist are cars, see Berry, Levinson and Pakes (1995) or Verboven, ready to 
eat cereals, see Nevo (1996), to name only a few. Many of the above have been used in 
actual decision making on mergers. 
8.  Although these are very different between sectors and countries, see Van Cayseele, Konings 
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p
m denotes the monopoly price, c marginal cost, magnitudes on both of the 
axes are measured on different scales. 
 